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Applying the Precautionary Principle 
to Private Persons : 
Should it Affect Civil and Criminal Liabiiity ?* 
T-» T» * * 
Bruce PARDY 
The precautionary principle, developdd in international environmen-
tal law, is a prospective concep.. It can be used to decide what should be 
allowed to occur in the future. The quesiion addressdd in this article is 
whethe,, in domestic law, the precautionary principle should be applied 
retrospectively. Should precautionary behaviour be used as a standard to 
apply to the past actions of private person,, so as to judge whether those 
persons have acted legally ? In the civil realm, the answer is « yes ». Ap-
plying the precautionary principle in civil cases removes foreseeability 
requirements, and transforms liability based on fautt into strict llability. 
In the criminal sphere, retrospective application of the precautionary prin-
ciple is not appropriate. To require precautionarr action on the part of an 
accused in an environmental prosecution transforms strict liability into 
absolute liability, and creates the potential for criminal punishment in the 
absence of culpability. 
Le principe de précaution, né en drott international de 
l'environnement, est un concept prospectif : il sert à déterminer ce que l'on 
peut laisser se produire à l'avenir. L' 'objtt de l'article est de déterminer si, 
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en droit national, le principe de précaution doit avoir une application 
rétrospeciive. Y a-t-il lieu d'utiliser un comportement marqué par la pru-
dence comme norme d'évaluaiion des actions passées d'une personne 
physique pour juger de la légalité de ses actions ? En droit civil, ,a réponse 
est « oui ». Appliquer le principe de précauiion en droit civil abolit le 
critère de prévisibilité et transforme la responsabilité fondée sur la faute 
en une responsabilité stricte. En droit crimine,, il ne convient pas 
d'appiiquer rétrospectivement le principe de précaution. Exiger une ac-
tion prudente de la part d'une personne accusée dans un contexte de droit 
environnemental transforme la responsabilité stricte en responsabilité 
absolue et engendee un risque de sanciion criminelle même sans 
culpabilité. > 
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Intellectuals solve problems ; geniuses prevent them. So Albert 
Einstein once observed. If that is so, the precautionary principle is an inge-
nious idea. The precautionary proposition is that action to protect the envi-
ronment should be taken even in the absence of scientific proof of harm ;' 
that decision makers should presume the existence of environmental risk 
« From a legal point of view the most important facet of the principle is that positive 
action to protect the environment may be required before scientific proof of harm has 
been provided » : D. FREESTONE and E. HEY, « Origins and Development of the 
Precautionary Principle», in D. FREESTONE and E. HEY (eds.), The Precautionary 
Principle and International Law : The Challenge of Implementation, Boston, Kluwer 
Law International, 1996, 3 at 13. 
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in the face of uncertainty ;2 and that the burden of proof should lie upon 
those who propose change.3 Essentially, the precautionary principle pro-
motes prevention of environmental harm. 
As a preventative measure, the precautionary principle generally has 
prospective application. The principle can be applied to the process of de-
veloping rules and deciding on proposed developments because these are 
prospective decisions. They are decisions about what should be allowed to 
occur in the future. The precautionary concept can be applied by legisla-
tive and administrative decision makers to answer the question, « What 
should we do tomorrow ? » 
This article addresses a more complex issue because it concerns ap-
plying the precautionary concept retrospectively instead of prospectively. 
Can the precautionary principle be used to assess legal liability for the ac-
tions of private persons after the fact ? Should individuals and corpora-
tions, whether manufacturing goods, spraying crops, disposing of waste, or 
harvesting lumber, be required to take the precautionary principle into ac-
count ? If so, they would be expected to assume that their activities create 
environmental risk. Behaviour inconsistent with the existence of such risk 
would produce civil and/or criminal liability. 
Is applying the principle in this way a good idea ? Should it be used as 
a standard to assess the past actions of particular persons, so as to judge 
whether they have acted legally ? Is it appropriate to use the principle to 
answer the question, not «What should we do tomorrow?» but «What 
should you have done yesterday ? » and, depending on the answer, impose 
liability ? 
In the sections below, I will argue that in the civil realm, the answer is 
« yes » : the precautionary principle should be used to evaluate the past 
actions of defendants in civil cases. It is not presently applied in this man-
ner by courts, and probably will not be in the foreseeable future. In the 
2. Greenpeace New Zealand Inc. v. Minister of Fisheries, [1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. 463 (Gallen 
J.) : « [T]he precautionary principle ought to be applied so that where uncertainty or igno-
rance exists, decision-makers should be cautious. » 
3. A. JORDAN and T. O'RIORDAN, The Precautionary Principle in U.K. Environmental Law 
and Policy, CSERGE Working Paper GEC 94-11, London, Centre for Social and 
Economic Research on the Global Environment, 1994, cited by D. VANDERZWAAG, 
« The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy : Elusive Rhetoric and 
First Embraces » (1998) 8 J.E.L.P. 355 at 359. VanderZwaag suggests that determining a 
precise meaning for the precautionary principle is difficult for at least four reasons : 
« definitional generalities, definitional variations, unresolved philosophical debates, and 
the vast spectrum of measures suggested to operationalize precaution » id. at 358. 
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criminal sphere, the answer is the reverse : I will argue that the precaution-
ary principle should not be applied in prosecutions for environmental of-
fences. However, at least one court has taken an equivalent step, and if 
there is a trend, it is in this direction. 
1 Civil liability 
1.1 Transforming fault-based liability into strict liability 
To test the application of the precautionary principle in the civil realm, 
consider the following scenario involving a leather tannery. The tannery 
uses a chemical, an organochlorine called perchloroethene, or PCE, to 
degrease pelts. PCE is delivered in large drums that are carried by forklift 
to a reservoir that feeds a degreasing machine. The forklift tips the drum 
and pours PCE into the reservoir. When PCE is poured in this manner, a 
few drops commonly spill onto the concrete floor of the tannery. 
During the period that this practice occurs, PCE is not thought to be 
harmful. It is not on any list of prohibited or regulated substances, and regu-
latory authorities do not test for its presence in drinking water. PCE is also 
known to be highly volatile, meaning that it evaporates easily and quickly. 
When small amounts of PCE spill on the ground, they can reasonably be 
expected to evaporate before they seep into the ground. 
A few years later, PCE is discovered in the groundwater near the site 
of the tannery. Somehow, despite its volatility, PCE found its way through 
the floor and into the ground before it evaporated. The contaminated 
groundwater is the water supply for a local municipality. Regulatory au-
thorities have determined that PCE is harmful to human health, and up-
dated regulations stipulate that drinking water must not contain PCE. If a 
party with rights to the water supply brings a civil action for compensa-
tion, what should be the result ? 
Liability on the part of the leather tannery on these facts is consistent 
with the application of the precautionary principle in civil actions. It is 
consistent with strict liability, for this is the effect of applying the precau-
tionary principle :4 it removes fault elements, and particularly the require-
4. « The precautionary principle may be considered as a theory and justification for strict 
liability for environmental harm rooted in the law of obligations or tort law with the goal 
of compensation for victims in case of harm ; the precautionary principle also may be 
understood broadly as a duty to take precautionary action and avoid risk » : C. TINKER, 
« State Responsibility and the Precautionary Principle », in D. FREESTONE and E. HEY 
(eds.), supra note 1, 53 at 55. 
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ment of foreseeability,5 from the cause of action. The precautionary prin-
ciple is essentially a renunciation of foreseeability as a relevant consider-
ation. The principle says, «Assume the worst, the unexpected, the 
unproven, and act accordingly. » What was reasonably foreseeable to the 
defendant is irrelevant, for the point of the precautionary principle is that 
in the absence of definitive proof to the contrary, environmental risk should 
be expected and assumed. Thus, the fact that the kind of damage caused 
was unforeseeable would not prevent liability from being imposed. 
On the other hand, imposition of liability on the above facts is not 
consistent with the current state of the law. In order for civil liability to 
result, objective fault, especially in the form of foreseeability of harm, must 
be established. The scenario above is essentially that from Cambridge 
Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather Pic.,6 a 1994 decision of the House 
of Lords. In that case, the tannery, Eastern Counties Leather, used PCE 
for degreasing pelts from sometime in the 1960s until 1991. Until 1976, PCE 
was delivered to the tannery in drums, and when the chemical was required, 
a forklift would tip a drum and pour PCE into a tank at the base of the 
machine. The trial judge found that during this period there were regular 
spillages of relatively small amounts of PCE onto the concrete floor of the 
tannery. It was not until sometime during the 1980s that new standards for 
drinking water were introduced, and PCE found its way onto a list of regu-
lated substances. PCE is highly volatile, and is generally thought to evapo-
rate rapidly. The trial court found that before 1976 a reasonable supervisor 
at the tannery would not have foreseen that such spillages would have 
caused any kind of environmental harm. It was not reasonable to antici-
pate either that PCE would enter the groundwater or, having done so, 
would produce « any sensible effect upon water taken down-catchment, or 
would otherwise be material or deserve the description of pollution. »7 
The action in Cambridge Water was brought in negligence, nuisance 
and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher} No liability was found to exist 
on the part of the tannery under any of these causes of action for a single 
5. In tort law, the term « fault » can have more than one meaning. It can be used in a narrow 
sense to refer specifically to negligent conduct ; that is, conduct that falls below a stan-
dard of reasonable care. It may also be given a wider meaning that encompasses various 
kinds of failures to act reasonably, such as failing to contemplate a foreseeable 
consequence. The term is used in the wider sense in this article. 
6. [1994] 1 All E.R. 53 ; ;1993] H.L.J. No. 411 
7. Id. at paragraph 7 (H.L.J.). 
8. (1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 265 ; (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
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reason : the damage was not foreseeable.9 The actions of the tannery had 
caused damage to the detriment of the plaintiff, but because the damage 
was not foreseeable, the tannery was not at fault and therefore was not 
liable. 
1.2 Strict liability v. Liability based on fault 
My opinion is that on these facts, the leather tannery should be liable. 
The precautionary principle should be applied in civil actions. Strict liabil-
ity in these circumstances is a better rule than liability based on fault. The 
requirement for fault is very strong in the current law of torts, and strict 
liability is often presumptuously and prematurely dismissed as archaic and 
unjust. True strict liability requires causation only. There is no element of 
fault. Some tort causes of action, such as private nuisance10 and the rule in 
Rylands v. Fletcher,11 are traditionally referred to as forms of strict liabil-
ity. If they ever were truly strict, they are no longer because of the require-
ment for foreseeability.12 They are less fault-based than negligence because 
they do not require negligent conduct,13 but they are not true strict liability 
regimes. 
The question whether fault should be required in tort actions for com-
pensation may be posed in two ways. One way is to ask : if a defendant has 
no reasonable expectation that her actions will cause harm, should she be 
found responsible for harm that does in fact result ? Put this way, imposing 
liability seems unjust. The defendant would be saddled with liability 
9. One of the important developments to come from the House of Lords judgment in Cam-
bridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather Pic, supra note 6, is the creation of a 
foreseeability requirement under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, supra note 8. Up until 
that time, Rylands was considered to be a rule of strict liability, whereas the action in 
private nuisance, from which Rylands originally came, had acquired fault requirements 
in the form of foreseeability of harm, a development triggered by the Privy Council's 
declaration in The Wagon Mound No. 2 (Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller 
Steamship Co. Pty.), [1967] 1 A.C. 617. See B. PARDY, « Requiem for Rylands v. Flet-
cher» [1994] N.Z.LJ. 130. 
10. Seee.g. Lord Simonds in Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd.,[1947] A.C. 156at 183: «Forifa 
man commits a legal nuisance it is no answer to his injured neighbour that he took the 
utmost care not to commit it. There the liability is strict, and there he alone has a lawful 
claim who has suffered an invasion of some proprietary or other interest in land. » 
11. See e.g. A.M. LINDEN, Canadian Tort Law, 6th ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1997, at 499 ; 
P. OSBORNE, The Law of Torts, Toronto, Irwin Law, 2000, at 297. 
12. See supra note 9. 
13. Except in Australia where Rylands v. Fletcher, supra note 8, has been subsumed under 
negligence: Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty. Ltd., [1994] 179 C.L.R. 520 
(H.C.). 
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through no moral wrongdoing of her own. This question is inadequate be-
cause it does not fully identify the choice that must be made. The better 
question to ask is : as between two innocent parties, the actor and the vic-
tim, who should pay ? Someone must shoulder the loss. The two possibili-
ties are the party who caused the damage, or the party who suffered it. 
Between these two, the one who caused the loss bears responsibility. The 
damage is a cost of the activity that the defendant carried out. If liability is 
not found, the effect is to thrust the cost of the defendant's activity onto 
the victim. The cost is externalized from the defendant to the plaintiff. In 
Cambridge Water, the contamination of the groundwater was caused by 
the tannery operation in the course of degreasing pelts. In other words, the 
water was contaminated for the purpose of degreasing pelts. Therefore, the 
cost of producing the leather consisted of the cost of the plant, equipment, 
and labour, the price of the pelts, the PCE, and the contamination of the 
water supply. The contamination of the water supply will not be a private 
cost for the tannery unless liability is found, but it is, in fact, a cost of the 
product irrespective of who ends up paying. If liability is not found, then 
the price of the pelts will not reflect the cost of cleaning the water, and 
therefore the victim with the dirty water will subsidize production of the 
leather. 
One of the purposes of the foreseeability requirement is to guard 
against indeterminate liability. It serves this role poorly. The danger of in-
determinate liability arises because a single tortuous act may have effects 
that reverberate down a long causal chain. If liability depended only upon 
causation, defendants could be saddled with liability « in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.»14 For ex-
ample, if a motor vehicle knocks down an electrical transformer, loss will 
result not just to the electricity company, but also to enterprises that have 
their electricity cut off, suppliers that sell goods to those enterprises, em-
ployees who are laid off because of decline in business, retail outlets that 
sell goods to those employees, and so on. If the defendant driver was held 
liable to those affected in any way by the downed power line, liability 
would indeed be disproportionate to the wrong. Liability would be more 
proportionate if it was limited, for instance, to responsibility for the physi-
cal damage caused by the collision. Foreseeability is a disingenuous method 
of achieving such a result because it requires fictional answers to do so. It 
is, in fact, entirely foreseeable that large numbers of people will be affected 
by a traffic accident that brings down a power line. However, in order to 
14. Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, [1931] 255 N.Y. 170 at 179 (Cardozo C.J.). 
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prevent indeterminate liability, a court may well find that the loss experi-
enced by most of those affected persons was not foreseeable. Thus, fore-
seeability is less a reason for limiting liability than it is an excuse. 
Furthermore, the foreseeability requirement prevents liability in cases 
where no danger of indeterminate liability exists. In Cambridge Water, for 
example, the plaintiff was denied compensation for physical harm caused 
by the defendant, and no extended causal chain was in issue. 
The precautionary principle, applied retrospectively, is inconsistent 
with the rules of tort liability as they presently exist.15 It is not compatible 
with the elements of negligence, nuisance or Rylands v. Fletcher, because 
all of these causes of action now require fault in the form of foreseeability. 
Whether the precautionary principle should be applied to tort actions for 
environmental harm depends upon whether those fault requirements are 
appropriate. Strict liability is more consistent with the dominant purpose 
of tort actions derived from actions on the case : to compensate. Tort li-
ability is not primarily intended to punish defendants, but to compensate 
victims harmed by the actions of others. To require fault on the part of 
defendants before liability will be imposed frustrates that purpose,16 and 
confuses the mandate with that of criminal law. The key determinant of 
liability should be causation, not fault. Thus, it is consistent with the pur-
poses of tort law to apply the precautionary principle to the actions of al-
leged tortfeasors. 
2 Criminal liability 
2.1 Transforming strict liability into absolute liability 
To test the application of the precautionary principle in the criminal 
sphere, consider the following scenario. An oil refinery has a pipe that 
pumps effluent into a body of water. The refining process uses 
methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl, or MMT, a gasoline addi-
tive. The refinery has a permit to use this chemical, under certain stipu-
15. There are exceptions. For example, vicarious liability may be imposed on an employer 
for the tortuous actions of an employee even where there is no negligence on the part of 
the employer and the actions of the employee are not foreseeable. « The law refers to 
such liability as 'vicarious' liability. It is also known as 'strict' or 'no-fault' liability, 
because it is imposed in the absence of fault of the employer » : Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 534 at 539 (McLachlin J.). 
16. That is not to suggest that fault requirements, and negligence in particular, do not have 
useful and sensible roles to play in determining tort liability. See B. PARDY, « Fault and 
Cause : Rethinking the Role of Negligent Conduct » (1995) 3 Tort L.R. 143. 
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lated conditions, and a system to remove the MMT from its effluent before 
it reaches the water. The company tests its effluent more frequently than 
required by its permit. It also has an environmental management system to 
deal with spills, and an environmental risk assessment program that exam-
ines every aspect of the operation every five years. One of the restrictions 
to which the refinery subject is section 36(3) of the federal Fisheries Act,11 
which states : 
[...] no person shall deposit [...] a deleterious substance of any type in water fre-
quented by fish [...] 
At the time the refinery is in operation, MMT is not considered to be 
harmful to fish. The Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) provided by the 
supplier of the MMT describes the kinds of hazards associated with the 
chemical. There is no indication in this information that MMT poses a dan-
ger to fish. Indeed, there is no published research from any source that 
suggests MMT is hazardous to fish. 
Despite these factors, an effluent discharge from the refinery fails a 
toxicity test. What was understood about the substance turns out to be 
wrong. Subsequent research shows that MMT can indeed be harmful to 
fish. Furthermore, the substance supplied to the refinery turns out to be 
not pure MMT, but a compound called LP46 consisting of 46 % MMT and 
54 % solvent, and the separator system at the refinery does not remove 
LP46 from the effluent. 
Before proceeding further, a review of the hierarchy of offences in the 
criminal and quasi-criminal realm is appropriate. In R. v. Sault Ste. Marie,]S 
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized three categories of offences : pure 
mens rea; strict liability; and absolute liability.19 Mens rea offences are 
17. Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14. 
18. R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299. 
19. Id. at 1325-1326. In theory, there are at least two other possibilities : negligence offences, 
in which the Crown would have the onus of proving actus reus and objective fault in the 
form of negligent behaviour ; and offences that employ a mandatory presumption of 
negligence, in which the accused would have to raise a reasonable doubt about negligence 
rather than establish due diligence on a balance of probabilities. THE ONTARIO LAW 
REFORM COMMISSION, Report on the Basis of Liability for Provincial Offences, Toronto, 
1990, recommended the latter as an alternative to strict liability offences, but the idea 
was rejected by Iacobucci J. in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 at 
257-258. See D. STUART, « Wholesale Travel : Presuming Guilt for Regulatory Offences 
is Constitutional but Wrong» (1992), 8 C.R. (4th) 225 at 228-229. In R. v. Ellis-Don Ltd. 
(1992), 71 C.C.C. (3d) 63 (Ont. C.A ) the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that it was 
not sufficient for an accused to merely raise a reasonable doubt about due diligence and 
that the accused's burden of establishing due diligence on a balance of probabilities was 
constitutional 
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« standard » criminal offences in which the Crown must establish not only 
the elements of the actus reus, but also actual awareness of the risk, often 
in the form of intent. Most pure criminal offences fall into this category. 
For example, the criminal offence of assault is satisfied by unwanted physi-
cal contact with another accompanied by the intent to make such physical 
contact.20 Accidentally tripping over a crack in the sidewalk and falling into 
the person beside you does not constitute assault, even if you were rushing 
and not looking where you were going. The effect upon the victim may the 
same in both cases, but intent of the actor is absent in the latter. 
Absolute liability offences are found at the other end of the scale. The 
commission of an absolute liability offence is established upon proof only 
of a prohibited act. The presence or absence of fault, either subjective or 
objective, is irrelevant. Some regulatory offences, such as traffic violations, 
have been held to be absolute liability offences.2' 
Strict liability offences are found in between these two extremes. In a 
prosecution for a strict liability offence, the Crown must establish the com-
mission of the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any 
other evidence, such proof results in conviction. However, unlike an abso-
lute liability offence, a strict liability offence allows an accused to excul-
pate himself by proving due diligence : that he took all reasonable care to 
prevent the commission of the offence, or that he had a reasonable belief in 
a mistaken set of facts that, if true, would have resulted in the offence not 
occurring.22 It is important to note the difference in the meaning of « strict 
liability » in the civil and criminal spheres. In tort, pure strict liability is 
liability in the absence of fault. It requires causation, but not negligence or 
foreseeability. In criminal law, strict liability means that the Crown has the 
onus of proving actus reus, and the accused may establish the absence of 
fault as a defence. 
To return to the scenario above, the facts are essentially those from R. 
v. Imperial Oil Ltd.P a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal. 
Imperial Oil was charged with, among other things, contravention of sec-
20. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 265(l)(a): «A person commits an assault when 
without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, 
directly or indirectly. » 
21. R. v. Kurtzman (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.). 
22. R. v, Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 18 at 1326 ; R. v. Rio Algom Ltd. (1989), 66 O.R. (2d) 
674 (C.A.). 
23. R. v. Imperial Oil Ltd., [2000] B.C.J. (Quicklaw) No. 2031 (B.C.C.A.) ; (2001) 148 C.C.C. 
(3d) 367 (B.C.C.A.). 
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tion 36(3) of the Fisheries Act?44 Contravention of section 36(3) is a strict 
liability offence,25 and in its defence, the refinery argued due diligence. At 
trial, an acquittal was entered on the basis of that defence. The trial judge 
concluded that the accused's environmental risk assessment program 
would have identified the potential problems with MMT had the toxicity 
test failure not occurred when it did.26 On appeal, the summary conviction 
appeal judge disagreed with the trial judge about the likelihood that the risk 
assessment program would have identified the problem. She reversed the 
acquittal and entered a conviction, despite noting that « [t]he problem [...] 
was that it was not known that MMT or LP46 was so lethal to fish. »27 She 
rejected the argument of Imperial Oil « that it ought hot to have been ex-
pected to have known of the toxicity problem because of the nature of the 
information from the supplier, the absence of information from the sup-
plier as to toxicity, the lack of scientific literature and the many years of 
using the product without incident. »28 
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, with the majority conclud-
ing that it was « not an answer for the appellant [Imperial Oil] to say that it 
had in general a good safety system, that it tested more frequently than 
necessary, and that it had a program which would likely have detected the 
hazard within the near future. »29 The majority did not mention the precau-
tionary principle, but in spite of acknowledging the absence of toxicity 
warning from the supplier and the lack of published scientific research, 
indicated that it was incumbent upon the accused to determine the toxicity 
of the chemical. The majority expressed its views in language consistent 
with the existence of the due diligence defence, but set the standard so high 
as to demand the benefit of hindsight in the actions of the accused. The 
dissenting Court of Appeal judge, Newbury J.A., expressed the view that 
the majority was « applying a standard of perfection »30 to conclude that 
Imperial Oil did not conduct itself with due diligence. To insist upon « per-
fection » or the benefit of hindsight in the performance of due diligence is 
essentially to deny its availability, and thus to transform a strict liability 
offence into one of absolute liability.31 
24. Fisheries Act, supra note 17. 
25. The offence is set out in section s. 40(2). 
26. R. v. Imperial Oil Ltd., supra note 23 at paragraph 31 (B.C.J.), Newbury J.A. (dissenting). 
27. Id. at paragraph 32. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Id. at paragraph 28, Finch J.A. 
30. Id. at paragraph 34. 
31. See P. CASSIDY, « Prosecuting Made Easy », The Lawyers Weekly, 17 November 2000,4. 
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2.2 Strict liability v. absolute liability 
The constitutionality of strict liability offences was settled by the Su-
preme Court of Canada in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.32 In that case, 
the Court decided that for regulatory or 'quasi-criminal' offences, it is con-
stitutional to place the onus upon an accused to disprove fault. An accused 
may be given the burden of establishing due diligence on a balance of prob-
abilities in order to avoid conviction of a regulatory offence. The Court held 
that it was consistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms33 to limit 
the burden on the Crown to that of proving the actus reus of the offence. It 
cited a number of different reasons for coming to this conclusion, including 
the propositions that : (a) regulatory prohibitions are essential to public 
welfare ;34 (b) conviction of a regulatory offence is less serious than con-
viction for a 'true' criminal offence, and therefore carries less stigma ;35 (c) 
citizens voluntarily submit themselves to particular regulatory regimes by 
choosing to carry out particular kinds of activities,36 and (d) evidence of 
fault is usually in the hands of the accused, thus making it difficult for pros-
ecutors to obtain convictions if fault was included as an element of the 
offence 37 
These justifications for departing from the requirement for subjective 
fault are not persuasive :38 (a) regulatory offences are not more important 
to public welfare than Criminal Code offences. Pollution is undesirable, but 
polluters are not more dangerous than rapists and murderers ; (b) convic-
tion for many regulatory offences, including environmental offences, in-
cludes the possibility of imprisonment. If conviction for regulatory offences 
is really less serious than for 'true' criminal offences, they should not carry 
the possibility of incarceration,39 the most severe penalty available in law ; 
32. R. v. Wholesale Travel Croup Inc., supra note 19. 
33. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) )982, cc .11 
34. R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., supra note 19 at 233-239 (Cory J.). 
35. Id. at 219-220 (Cory J.). 
36. Id. at 228-232 (Cory J.) ; at 258-259 (Iacobucci J.). 
37. Id. at 245-247 (Cory J.) ; at 257 (Iacobucci J.). 
38. See D. STUART, supra note 19. 
39. Under section s. 40(2) of the Fisheries Act, supra note 17, every person who contravenes 
subsection 36(1) or (3) is guilty of «(a) an offence punishable on summary conviction 
and liable, for a first offence, to a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand dollars and, 
for any subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand dollars or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both ; or (b) an indictable 
offence and liable, for a first offence, to a fine not exceeding one million dollars and, for 
any subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding one million dollars or to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding three years, or to both. » 
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(c) voluntary submission is a fiction. Regulation is so widespread in virtu-
ally all sectors of the economy that there is not much prospect of engaging 
in a productive enterprise that is not subject to regulation. Therefore, it is 
inaccurate to say that citizens choose to make themselves subject to regu-
lation ; and (d) evidence of fault is always in the hands of the accused, re-
gardless of what type of offence is in question. This fact does not prevent 
the Crown from carrying the burden of proving mens rea in Criminal Code 
prosecutions.40 
The judgment in Wholesale Travel found that strict liability was con-
stitutional, but the conclusion is dependent upon the availability of the due 
diligence defence.41 If a standard of conduct requiring « perfection » or the 
benefit of hindsight is applied to the due diligence defence, as in Imperial 
Oil, an accused's ability to satisfy its requirements are significantly dimin-
ished. If strict liability is moved closer to absolute liability, are the conclu-
sions in Wholesale Travel still valid ? Consider the route : 
1) Strict liability, not absolute liability, was the compromise that the Su-
preme Court of Canada reached in Sault Ste. Marie between the inter-
ests of public welfare and the rights of the accused. 
2) Strict liability, not absolute liability, was the category of offence that 
the Supreme Court of Canada determined in Wholesale Travel was a 
reasonable limit on the guarantee of presumption of innocence. 
3) The justifications relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada in com-
ing to that conclusion are weak. 
4) In Wholesale Travel, the Court held that absolute liability accompa-
nied by a possibility of imprisonment was unconstitutional.42 
40. «The trouble with these arguments of law enforcement expediency is that they could 
demonstrably justify any reverse onus clause for any type of crime » : D. STUART, supra 
note 19 at 229. Stuart quotes a pre-Charter observation of Mr. Justice Dickson in the 
Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Strasser v. Roberge (1979), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 129 at 
139, that mere difficulty of enforcement « cannot justify the shifting of a burden of proof 
of the mental element to the accused, for if that were the case one could easily justify 
doing away with the presumption of mens rea and the presumption of innocence in 
criminal law proper. » 
41. The court struck down requirements in the Competition Act that demanded a higher stan-
dard than reasonable care. See D. STUART, Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed., 
Scarborough, Carswell, 2001, at 191. 
42. Confirming its decision in Reference re s. 94 of the Motor Vehicle Act (British Colum-
bia), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 ; R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.. supra note 19 at t95 (Lamer 
J.) ; at 253 (Cory J.) ; at 255 (Iacobucci J.). 
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5) Many strict liability offences may be punished by imprisonment. 
6) Applying the precautionary principle to the due diligence defence 
would diminish its availability, and effectively transform offences of 
strict liability into absolute liability. 
2.3 Passing the buck 
MMT should not be getting into waterways, even through inadvert-
ence. The fact that MMT did escape into water in the Imperial Oil case 
indicates that someone was not carrying out its responsibilities. In my opin-
ion, that someone was not Imperial Oil. It was the state. Section 36(3) of 
the Fisheries Act does not specify a standard of behaviour or precisely 
define a prohibition. To create a strict liability offence with a vague statu-
tory provision, and then to require precautionary action on the part of an 
accused, is essentially to say to private enterprises, « We do not really know 
what the rule is. We are giving you the job of making the judgment about 
when the standard might be breached. If you get it wrong, you are on your 
own. We will hold you criminally responsible for an action that only in 
retrospect has proved to be contrary to the provision. »43 
Consider the wording of section 36(3). It states : « [...] no person shall 
deposit [...] a deleterious substance of any type in water frequented by fish 
[...]». For private actors trying to figure out what they are and are not al-
lowed to do, the definition of « deleterious substance » provided in the 
Act44 does not assist. If the precautionary principle is to be applied to pros-
ecutions for violation of this provision, private citizens and commercial 
43. In Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, the Supreme Court of Canada 
found a vague environmental prohibition constitutional. In his concurring judgment, 
Chief Justice Lamer stated that the availability of the defence of due diligence had no 
bearing on the question of whether the impugned provision was unconstitutionally va-
gue (id. at 1043). 
44. In section 34, « deleterious substance » is defined as : 
(a) any substance that, if added to any water, would degrade or alter or form part of a 
process of degradation or alteration of the quality of that water so that it is rendered or 
is likely to be rendered deleterious to fish or fish habitat or to the use by man of fish that 
frequent that water, or 
(b) any water that contains a substance in such quantity or concentration, or that has 
been so treated, processed or changed, by heat or other means, from a natural state that 
it would, if added to any other water, degrade or alter or form part of a process of 
degradation or alteration of the quality of that water so that it is rendered or is likely to 
be rendered deleterious to fish or fish habitat or to the use by man of fish that frequent 
that water, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing includes 
(c) any substance or class of substances prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2)(a), 
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operations will be required to do what government cannot or will not do 
itself, which is to determine and identify the circumstances that fall on ei-
ther side of the line. The regulator thus avoids applying the precautionary 
principle to itself, and instead foists it upon parties with fewer investiga-
tive resources. 
A better way to achieve the application of the precautionary principle 
is to apply it prospectively to the formulation of the statutory rule. Change 
the wording of the provision. The prohibition in the Fisheries Act could 
read :«[...] no person shall deposit & foreign substance of any type in water 
frequented by fish, unless the substance is specifically approved by regula-
tion [...]». This provision contains an effective application of the precau-
tionary principle. The prohibition is broad but clear. Substances that are 
not normally found in water would be prohibited unless specifically ap-
proved before their release. The provision eliminates retrospective appli-
cation of the principle. It removes the investigative and evaluative burden 
from private persons, and places it upon government where it belongs. It 
makes government legally and politically responsible. It prevents govern-
ment from passing the buck. 
Whereas the primary purpose of tort law is compensation, the primary 
purpose of criminal law is punishment. It is an essential difference. The 
focus in tort cases should rest on the loss caused by the defendant to the 
plaintiff rather than on the degree of blameworthiness of the defendant ; 
whereas in criminal cases, the subjective fault of the accused is of primary 
importance. Punishment requires culpability. 
Conclusion 
Courts have not referred to the precautionary principle in bringing the 
law to its present state. Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate about what 
their view would be about applying a precautionary concept. In the civil 
area, the proposition probably would not be entertained. Courts would re-
sist finding liability for consequences that were not foreseeable. Fault-
based liability is firmly established in negligence, nuisance, and Rylands v 
Fletcher to the benefit of defendants and the detriment of plaintiffs. In the 
criminal realm, in contrast, courts have applied demanding standards for 
(d) any water that contains any substance or class of substances in a quantity or concen-
tration that is equal to or in excess of a quantity or concentration prescribed in respect 
of that substance or class of substances pursuant to paragraph (2)(b), and 
(e) any water that has been subjected to a treatment, process or change prescribed 
pursuant to paragraph (2)(c). 
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establishing due diligence.45 To require precautionary behaviour would not 
be a significant shift in approach. The court in Imperial Oil reached a result 
consistent with applying the precautionary principle to the issue of due 
diligence. 
The law is now in the peculiar state of producing results opposite to 
what fundamental principles should dictate. If a person causes environmen-
tal harm that was not foreseeable, that person may be found guilty of a 
criminal offence but not civilly liable to compensate the victim for the loss. 
Such a result flies in the face of traditional expectations. It is not consis-
tent with the purposes and roles that these two kinds of liability are in-
tended to serve. Civil liability is, at root, about compensation for causation 
of harm, not about culpability. Criminal liability is about moral blamewor-
thiness ; often, causing harm is not even an element of the offence. Civil 
liability, requiring proof on a balance of probabilities, is supposed to be 
easier to establish than criminal liability. Criminal law is supposed to pro-
vide accused persons with the right of presumption of innocence and the 
protection of the Crown's burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
A precautionary concept should be applied in civil cases, but not in 
criminal or regulatory prosecutions. The precautionary principle may be 
an ingenious idea, but it does not automatically produce ingenious results. 
45. See for example R. v. Kurtzman, supra note 21, and R. v. Alexander, [1999] N.J. 
(Quicklaw) No. 19 (Nfld. C.A.) (due diligence requires care related to the « particular 
event » giving rise to the charge, rather than a more general standard of care) ; Ontario v. 
London Excavators & Trucking Limited (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 32 (C.A.) (an accused is not 
entitled to rely on information from other sources in determining the extent of risk) ; R. 
v. Rio Algom, supra note 22 (Court of Appeal entering a conviction despite the trial 
judge's finding that the accident was unforeseeable). 
